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Banks are the most important financial intermediaries and major providers
of institutionalized loan financing in the economic systems worldwide. Ex-
ternalities of their activities affect the economy deeply. Therefore, regula-
tion of their behavior is of utmost importance for the general public. In
addition, national and supranational prudential authorities request vari-
ous forms and extents of mandatory disclosure. Nevertheless, voluntary
disclosure is being recognized by the banks as a mechanism of asymmetric
expectations’reduction and confidence enhancement of current and poten-
tial both shareholders and stakeholders. Upgrading information availability
and updating its quality might be a useful way of reducing the probability
of systemic banking crisis as well as a useful tool for improving market
discipline. However, the causes and consequences of banks’ disclosure of
∗Faculty of Economics, University of Split, Matice hrvatske 31, 21 000 Split, Phone: ++
385 21 430 752 Fax: ++ 385 21 430 701, E-mail address: akundid@efst.hr
†Faculty of Economics, University of Split, Matice hrvatske 31, 21 000 Split, Phone: ++
385 21 430 772 Fax: ++ 385 21 430 701, E-mail address: arogosic@efst.hr
86
Economic Research - Ekonomska Istrazivanja Vol. 25, SE 1, 2012 Page:87
accounting and other information are still challengeable issues in finan-
cial literature. In that regard, the purpose of the paper is to explore the
determinants of Croatian banks’ online disclosure of financial informa-
tion. Bank specific and industry specific factors of disclosure are being
empirically examined using univariate and multivariate statistical meth-
ods. Further research objective is to compare the volume and the structure
of mandatory disclosed information using content analysis. It is expected
that banks with higher transparency achieve significantly better financial
performance. However, the paper does not empirically investigate ben-
efits or drawbacks of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. For all
the aforementioned reasons the paper might be provide useful insights for
academics, students of economics and, most of all, for the general public,
especially depositors as major providers of bank funds.
1 INTRODUCTION
Increased financial transparency of banks and rise of their website reporting has
recently been fostered by the adoption of Basel II Standard, or more precisely, its
third pillar on market discipline. Market discipline “is a regulatory mechanism
that delegates the monitoring and disciplining task not only to the national
and international regulators but also to the market participants whose wealth is
affected by the banks’conduct”(Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003, 753). It refers
to “the way in which holders of bank liabilities, such as subordinated debt or
uninsured deposits, ‘punish’banks which take greater risks by demanding higher
yields”(Baumman and Nier, 2003, 134). Furthermore, e-transparency refers to
the “level of corporate information disclosed on the internet”(Serrano-Cinca et
al., 2006, 312).
It is expected that market disciplining will be mostly conducted by the subordi-
nated debt holders and other fund holders non-covered by the deposit insurance
systems (Bliss, 2001; Baumann and Nier, 2003; Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003;
Herring, 2003) which lose their assets when the bank defaults, but “do not have
any benefits of any upside gain when the bank takes excessive risk”(Ceuster and
Masschelein, 2003, 754-755). Their behavior could have signaling effect mostly
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for the bank supervisors. In addition, Barth et al. (2002) empirically evidenced
that the use of subordinated debt is strongly and positively connected with bank
profitability which is supported by the data from more than 2 300 banks across
55 countries. This is why some authors reported findings on higher transparency
regulation of banks as a substitute for the safety net creation (Hyytinen and
Takalo, 2004) in order to prevent excessive risk taking by banks and occurrence
of systemic crises. Moreover, governor Warsh (FED, Speech, 2010) has recently
addressed the need for resurrection of market discipline as a complementary
pillar of prudential regulation in order to reduce too-big-to-fail problem and use
of the systemic risk exception.
For the above outlined facts, supranational Basel recommendations in its third
pillar seem to be consistent with the empirical evidence on the relevance of
regulation level and type (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Barth et
al., 2001a; Barth et al., 2001b; Nier, 2005; Tadesse, 2006) in prevention of
banking crises and altering banking sector development. For example, in their
cross-country analysis that included 107 countries in the period from 1998-2000,
Barth et al. (2001b, 37) found out that “private monitoring is strongly posi-
tively linked with bank development and negatively associated with net interest
margin and the level of nonperforming loans”while it is not statistically sig-
nificantly connected with banking crises. However, one of the most powerful
evidences of the positive impacts of bank-disclosure requirements in prevention
of banking crises is provided in Tadesse’s (2006) cross-country analysis that en-
compassed 49 countries over the period from 1990-1997. These research results
are consistent with those of Nier (2005) that were obtained from the sample
of 550 listed banks across 32 countries over the years 1994-2000. Nevertheless,
Basel II Standards only promote and encourage more market monitoring of bank
behavior believing that market participants have suffi cient initiative to act as
a disciplining mechanism. Likewise Kalfaoglou and Sarris (2006, 5) concluded:
“Pillar III seems to focus on the availability of information and little concern
has been shown whether the interested parties gather, process and interpret in-
formation in a consistent and appropriate manner”. In such a manner, governor
Tarullo (FED, Speech, Tarullo, 2010, 3) summarized that “there is a little point
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—and the potential for considerable unnecessary cost —in compelling disclosure
of massive amounts of information that cannot be effectively assimilated by
investors and counterparties”. Therefore, suggestions for enhancement of mar-
ket supervision proposed by Herring (2003) should serve as the most complete
framework that could be adopted by the prudential authorities in re-building
safe and sound financial system.
Expected results of regulation moving toward the “invisible-hand” discipline
(Herring, 2003) should lead to more prudent behavior of banks, reduced in-
tervention of banks into the safety net and circumvention of banking crises.
However, the recent financial crisis demonstrated the insuffi ciency of both reg-
ulatory and market supervision. Ineffi ciency of market discipline might be a
consequence of underdeveloped market disciplining, exaggerated confidence in
continuous market growth, self-destructive appetites of fund holders, their over-
reacted, synchronized actions or the quality of reported financial items. Thus,
Baumann and Nier (2003) reported that the strength and effectiveness of market
discipline depends on the generosity of the safety net, on the level of bank’s unin-
sured liabilities and the transparency of bank’s risks. In that line, Warsh pointed
out that “the growing specter of government support threatens to weaken market
discipline, confuse price signals, and create a class of institutions that operate
under different rules of the game”leading to “quasi-public”financial institutions
(FED, Speech, Warsh, 2010, 2). On the other hand, consequences and costs of
bank runs caused by coordinated and excessive movements of disturbed cred-
itors alter concern about effi ciency of market discipline that “has a tendency
to become lax late in economic booms and excessively tight in busts” (FED,
Speech, Warsh, 2010, 3). With regard to this, Tadesse (2006, 33) summarized
that the role of bank transparency in banking system stability is controversial
and may result with positive informational externalities (“transparency-stability
hypothesis”) in the form of effi cient allocation of resources or negative informa-
tional externalities (“transparency-fragility hypothesis”) in form of individual
bank run, systemic crises and stock market collapse. For the above outlined
reasons issues on the socially optimal bank disclosure are challengeable and
reaffi rmed in mature financial systems, both among supervisors and academics
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(Baumann and Nier, 2003 and 2004; Nier, 2005; Kalfaoglou and Sarris, 2006;
Tadesse, 2006; Alexandre et al., 2010).
This paper aims to research the level of compliance to the normative disclosure
requirements by the banks in the Republic of Croatia as well as their voluntary
financial reporting. Review of the empirical background on this issue suggests
that this is the first research of this kind for the Croatian banking sector since
Credit Institution Act enactment. Previously, solely Huang (2006) on behalf
of the World Bank reported research results on bank disclosure indexes for all
177 countries in the world, among which Croatia was ranked as 97th. On the
other hand, voluntary online corporate reporting has been vastly examined in
Croatia (Pervan, 2006; Pervan, 2009; Rogošíc et al., 2008). Moreover, the goal of
this study is to evaluate disclosure content of the banks in Croatia in relation to
their bank-specific characteristics. With respect to this, non-weighted disclosure
indexes were built up in the paper, as dealt with in Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006).
In addition, Hossain (2008, 666) also implemented unweighted disclosure index
methodology due to the notice that “the use of unweighted and weighted scores
for the items disclosed in annual reports and accounts can make little or no
difference to the findings”. However, whether the disclosure is beneficial for
banks and useful for market participants or banking system in its entirety is
not intended to be answered in this paper, and is beyond its scope. Finally,
Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006, 728) concluded that “the next phase of voluntary
disclosure will be extended to other topics of concern such as information on
environmental protection or intangible assets”. Therefore, our future empirical
research will follow up on this prognosis.
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2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACK-
GROUND
2.1 INFORMATION AND EXPECTATIONS IN MAR-
KETRELATIONS: THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTS
Why is public disclosure important in the market-based economy? Theoreti-
cal background on the relevance of public disclosure consists of few explana-
tory views. Theory of perfect competition and effi cient market hypothesis are
the most rudimentary ones. According to the theory of perfect competition
promoted by neoclassical economists, market transparency, as one of the un-
derlying theoretical assumptions, is achieved if two preconditions are fulfilled
(Pojatina, 2000, 143). Firstly, information relevant for decision making should
be distributed widely to the public and available at the lowest possible costs.
Public disclosure can be mandatory or voluntary, free of charge or chargeable,
self-disclosed by companies or disclosed by information intermediaries like credit
rating agencies, financial analysts, investment advisors, auditors, financial press
and supervisors. Therefore, private or market supervision of companies can
be executed directly by investors or indirectly throughout information interme-
diaries (Figure 1). Mandatory disclosure requirements should be particularly
useful for investors as they turn information into the public good (Prescott,
2008), reduce multiple costs and potential free-rider problem in information
acquisition (Pojatina, 2004). Secondly, market participants should be capable
of using this data in their decision making. Hereafter, it needs to be noticed,
as Baumann and Nier (2004, 31) cite Greenspan, that public disclosure and
transparency should not be treated as interchangeable, because “transparency
challenges market participants not only to provide information but also to place
that information into a context that makes it meaningful”. Although trans-
actional costs of acquiring information have been continuously at decrease in
the last two decades, their interpretation still remains challengeable for external
users. Thus, effi cient market hypothesis or theory of informational effi ciency
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seems to overhaul more real and disputable research issues. It includes comple-
mentary empirical findings on the effi ciency of price effects in the market with
regard to the available information that are disclosed in a certain point of time
(Pojatina, 2000, 181-185). According to its conclusions market disciplining is
done in relation to the past, present and future or predictable information and
expectations of company’s performance. Thus, asset prices are nearly always
an accurate and unbiased assessment of disclosed information. Despite of the
shortcomings of the aforementioned theories and their failures in explanation of
certain price movements, “corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of
an effi cient capital market”(Healy and Palepu, 2001, 406).





















Source: modified according to: Healy, P.M. and Palepu, K.G. (2001): Informa-
tion asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the
empirical disclosure literature, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31,
408.
Healy and Palepu (2001, 405) summarized that “financial reporting and disclo-
sure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm per-
formance and governance to outside investors”as well as to other stakeholders.
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What is the impulse to make private information publicly available, especially
when there is possibility of their free riding by competitors? Theory of the firm
suggests that a reduction in informational asymmetries between company, their
managers and investors in order to prevent adverse market response is the key
reason. Informational asymmetries show up before and after the investment
process and amplify the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, ex ante
and ex post of the investment process, respectively. Thus, firms disclose their
information to distinguish themselves from less successful firms, particularly in
order to reduce “information” or “lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970), “agency
problem”(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and higher funding costs (Myers, 1984).
On the macroeconomic level, regulation prescribes minimal disclosure require-
ments in order to prevent systemic market failure in form of credit and equity
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) caused by fears, disappointments and ac-
tions of uninformed and unsophisticated investors. More precisely, according to
the contemporary theory of financial intermediation (Bisignano, 1998; Scholtens
and van Wensveen, 2000, 2003) that is applicable to the corporate finance, asym-
metrical expectations derived from asymmetrical information have pivotal role
in investors’ behavior (selection and monitoring of investments). Their risk
management strategies or, so called, mechanisms of market discipline can be
visible in price effects (risk-return adjustments of investments), quantity effects
(additional investments, withdraw of funds, fire sales) and valuation techniques
(changes in the market value). In addition, risk management strategies include
several other techniques like adoption of restrictive clauses, required collaterals
and guarantees as well as change of managerial structures. However, it should
be noticed that public disclosure ex ante and ex post the investment decision is
only one of the available tools that can be used in order to reduce asymmetrical
information and thus asymmetrical expectations of the investors. Furthermore,
the question on its effi ciency remains open. With regards to this, Healy and
Palepu (2001, 410-411) raise a number of questions on: the role of disclosure
regulation in mitigating information and agency problems, the effectiveness of
auditors and information intermediaries in increasing the credibility of manage-
ment disclosures and uncovering new information, factors affecting managers’
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disclosure decisions and economic consequences of disclosure.
Nevertheless, banks are extraordinarily opaque enterprises for their explicit and
implicit fund holders due to information nature of their business and risks im-
posed by twofold imperfect information, between banks and their debtors as well
as between banks and their creditors (Pojatina, 2004). However, if the financial
markets were perfect, banks would not exist at all, according to the traditional
theory of financial intermediation (Allen and Santomero, 1996, 1999). As dele-
gated managers, both by their shareholders and creditors, banks are nowadays
required to disclose their financial and annual reports and qualitative informa-
tion with purpose to preserve bank shareholders and stakeholders from potential
losses, banking system from the appearance of systematic risk case and govern-
ments from unnecessary public costs. Quantitative and qualitative disclosures
of bank performance should, thus, reduce both uncertainty and transactional
costs of the interested parties. However, the most useful information on bank
management based on supervisors off-site and on-site controls is forbidden for
disclosure for both supervisors and the examined banks. Possible explanations
of such practice are given by Prescott (2008, 2): “the ability of a bank supervisor
to accurately gauge the quality of a bank and the incentives of a bank to keep
that information quiet in bad times are fundamental problems in bank regula-
tion”. If supervisor’s ratings like CAMELS were disclosed, costs of cooperation
of supervised banks to provide supervisor with information would increase with
the consequences of either decreased quality of information that the supervisor
receives or higher costs of collecting the information. This is why private com-
panies like credit rating agencies have a strong incentive to inflate the ratings of
their clients. Furthermore, Herring (2003) warned about several areas of con-
cern on the issue of effi ciency of market discipline in banking practice such as:
lack of transparency, inadequate incentives to impose discipline of banks, biased
prices and destabilizing flows due to herd-like or mimetic behaviour of market
participants, and market discipline that may not influence bank behavior, both
ex ante and ex post of public disclosure. In addition, Kalfaoglou and Sarris
(2006, 6) conclude that “the effectiveness of the market discipline depends on
three aspects, the bank’s disclosure policy, the ability of the market participants
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to assess bank’s riskiness (ability to monitor) and the ability to impose disci-
pline (ability to influence)”. Therefore, direct costs of disclosure and potential
indirect costs of disclosure, whether they are private (in form of cost of capital
and market volatilities) or social costs (in form of financial system safety and
soundness as well as fiscal costs) should be taken into consideration when setting
up macroprudential disclosure framework and individual bank disclosure policy.
2.2 INTERDEPENDENCE OF DISCLOSURE POLICY
ANDBANKPERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL BACK-
GROUND
Empirical examinations on the public disclosure have usually been executed in
two directions: ex ante and ex post of mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Ex
ante literature contains complementary explanations on the determinants of the
level of public disclosure (Bonsón-Ponte et al., 2006; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2006;
Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Spiegel and Yamori, 2004). Ex post
analyses investigate the effects of corporate reporting on market volatility and
cost of capital in order to examine benefits and drawbacks of public disclosure
for the banking firm (Baumann and Nier, 2003; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Nier,
2005). Taking into consideration the research scope of the paper, the first group
of papers will serve as a building block for our research.
Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006) analyzed the compliance of voluntary disclosed
data of 54 internationally active European banks that were included in Dow
Jones EuroStoxx index with mandatory requirements that were announced to
be enforced with Basel II Standard. The research results proved statistically
significant impact of size on disclosure index. The largest banks turned out to
have higher degree of e-transparency that included approximately 37 % of the
required data from the Basel’s third pillar.
Serrano-Cinca et al. (2006) reported research results on determinants of internet
disclosure for 70 Spanish financial institutions. Using the structural equation
model, the authors obtained results on statistically significant impact of finan-
cial institution’s size on e-transparency and internet visibility while financial
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performance was not statistically significant to e-transparency due to demon-
strated size-performance dependence in the model. Thus, influence of financial
performance to online reporting is proved to be indirect.
Hossain (2008) examined the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure for
38 listed banks in India in relation to selected bank-specific characteristics in
the period 2002-2003. It turned out that selected banks on average disclose
60 % of overall observed disclosure contents out of which 88 % are mandatory
and 25 % are voluntary items. Bank size variable as well as profitability, credit
risk, own funds financing and board composition proved out to be statistically
significantly connected with disclosure index, whilst bank age, complexity of
business and assets-in-place proved irrelevant for disclosure index explanation.
Estimated parameters were positive for bank size, profitability and board com-
position while for non-performing loans and capital adequacy ratio they were
negative. In addition, previously Hossain and Reaz (2007) provided empirical
evidence that diversification and multiple exchange listing do not affect bank
voluntary disclosure for the same sample of banks.
Spiegel and Yamori (2004) analyzed the determinants of voluntary disclosure
by Japanese Shinkin banks1 for the 1996 and 1997 and provided empirically
evidenced justification for mandatory disclosures that followed. On the data
sample of slightly less than 400 Shinkin bank, the hypothesis that the poorly
capitalized, small banks operating in less competitive markets with weak credit
risk policies avoid voluntary disclosures on non-performing loans issue, was ver-
ified.
Baumann and Nier (2004) set up empirical evidence for the relationship be-
tween the volatility of bank’s stock price and the amount of information the
bank discloses to the market. They reported that higher level of disclosure
content (measured with disclosure index) reduces stock volatility as it was ex-
1Shinkin banks “are relatively small financial institutions that are privately held by mem-
bers living or operating near a bank’s headquarters”(Speigel and Yamori, 2004, p. 6). These
mutual credit associations mostly finance small and medium size enterprises and can grant
a maximum of 20 % of their loans to non-members. Deposits can be accepted both from
members and non-members.
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pected. Thus, information disclosure may be useful to investors and banks. The
research was conducted on the data from about 600 banks across 31 countries
over the period 1993-2000. However its limitations are related to the use of av-
eraged bank data. Previously, Baumann and Nier (2003) also evidenced on the
effect of market discipline on bank risk-taking. They concluded that the level
of capital buffers that are proxies for bank’s ultimate risk absorption are weak-
ened with adverse effects of deposit insurance systems while strengthened by
larger interbank deposit financing and higher disclosure indexes. Thus, market
discipline may reduce banks´ incentives to increase their risk profile. Finally,
Nier (2005) verified that net effects of bank disclosure, as difference between ex
post (reduced market volatility and banking system stability) and ex ante ef-
fects (prevention of excessive risk taking) substantially contribute to prevention
of banking crises.
3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF BANK
FINANCIAL REPORTING
Convergence in regulation of banking business has moved into the direction
of promoting market discipline. Supranational prudential regulation conducted
mainly by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision stressed the importance
of public disclosure of the internationally active banks. Thus, the third pillar
of Basel proposals is focused on market discipline and is complementary with
the minimum capital requirements (first pillar) and supervisory review process
(second pillar)2 . The European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union adopted Basel “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework”from 2004 into its Capital Require-
ments Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. As a candidate for the European
Union, Croatia adopted the abovementioned directives into Credit Institutions
Act (Offi cial Gazzette, 117, 2008). This Act was put into the effect 1st January
2“. . . such disclosures have particular relevance under the Framework, where reliance on
internal methodologies gives banks more discretion in assessing capital requirements” (Bank
for International Settlements, 2004, 175).
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2009 and thus its requirements for the mandatory website disclosures of finan-
cial and annual reports while mandatory online reporting of other required data
was postponed for 30st September 2010 in the Republic of Croatia (Decision
on the public disclosure of creditworthiness requirements of credit institutions,
Offi cial Gazzette No. 1/2009, No. 75/2009 and No. 2/ 2010). According to
the Credit Institutions Act (Offi cial Gazzette, 117, 2008, Article 175, Paragraph
3) “credit institution is obliged to disclose its revised non-consolidated financial
statements together with its annual report on its websites and is obliged to make
them available at the latest within five months since the end of business year
for which they are related to”. The Act prescribes additional requests related
to this issue in form of organization of internal control system that must have a
function of monitoring compliance in order to manage compliance risk. Croat-
ian National Bank has a right to charge penalty from 500 000 to 2 000 000 HRK
for not fulfilling these disclosure requirements.
According to the Croatian Accounting Act, banks are considered (classified)
as large entrepreneurs and obligated to prepare financial statements respecting
the International Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting
Standards (Offi cial Gazette, 109, 2007). The latest Accounting Act (applied
from January 1st 2008) determines the publication of an additional report, An-
nual report, for medium and large entrepreneurs. The content of the Annual
Report is compliant to the Article 46 of the Fourth European Union Directive
and is given in the empirical framework of the paper.
Also, the Annual Report of banks, as large entrepreneurs, has to contain the
rules of Code of Corporate Governance. The banks that are listed on Zagreb
Stock Exchange must apply the rules of Code of Corporate Governance prepared
by Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency and Zagreb Stock Exchange
(Offi cial Gazette, 46, 2007). Banks are required to fill in annual questionnaire
(once a year) that is part of the Code, for the period covered by the annual
financial statements, and submit the completed annual questionnaire with the
annual financial statements.
Banks are obliged to submit the annual financial statements, Annual report and
audit report to the Financial Agency for public release (according to Article 20 of
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Accounting Act). The Decision on the structure and content of annual financial
statements issued by the Croatian National Bank (Offi cial Gazette, 62, 2008)
prescribes the preparation of the financial statements (Balance sheet, Income
statement, Cash flow statement, Report of changes in equity and Notes to the
financial statements) in the forms required by that Decision.
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEON INTERNETDIS-
CLOSURE IN CROATIN BANKING SEC-
TOR
4.1 HYPOTHESES
Accounting information relevant to economic decision-making is available in
the fundamental financial statements. Since the Internet disclosure of finan-
cial statements and Annual report is obligatory for banks in Croatia, the first
hypothesis is therefore as follows:
H1: Banks in the Republic of Croatia generally disclose mandatory financial
statements and annual report on their websites in which small banks publish
less information.
According to the results of the previous researches (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2006;
Hossain, 2008) it is expected that more profitable banks are more willing to
disclose their financial results on the Internet in order to distinguish themselves
from their competitors on suffi ciently competitive market. Self-disclosure on
good rather than adverse news is expected to be proved with the second hy-
pothesis:
H2: Bank profitability is positively related to voluntary financial reporting.
Since larger banks have a wider financial public (among all the mentioned rea-
sons), the assumption is that the bank size is statistically significantly related
to the level of voluntary and mandatory disclosure, likewise proved in Spiegel
and Yamori (2004), Bonsón-Ponte et al. (2006), Serrano-Cinca et al. (2006),
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Hossain and Reaz (2007) and Hossain (2008). One of the possible explanations
is that “large firms need to raise capital in the market more frequently and are
under great pressure from shareholders and market analysts for increased dis-
closures”(Spiegel and Yamori, 2004, 11). Thus, large banks are more oriented
towards subordinated debt than deposit based smaller banks and should there-
fore publicly disclose more data in order to reduce total cost of capital. Bearing
in mind the above, the third hypothesis is:
H3: Bank size determines level of public disclosure.
Hence, the latter hypothesis might provoke the question of the existence of
structure-conduct performance or effi ciency structure hypothesis that relates
bank market share to its profitability, whereas large banks are more profitable
due to their higher market concentration or their effi ciency in providing ser-
vices. Thus, bank size could determine its level of disclosure indirectly through
affecting its profitability as proved in Serrano-Cinca et al. (2006).
Furthermore, higher capital adequacy ratio as an internationally accepted indi-
cator of bank stability should be negatively related to the volume of disclosed
information, likewise in Hossain (2008). However it is questionable whether
this is caused with lower monitoring or bankruptcy costs or the fact that large
banks can hold smaller amounts of own funds as they are too-big-to-fail and have
better risk management practices including higher diversification opportunities.
Therefore, the final hypothesis is:
H4: The level of Croatian banks e-transparency is determined by market
share and capital adequacy.
4.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The research is focused on the banking sector operating in Croatia and includes
all 32 banks. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial
information on the Internet was monitored twice, in September 2010 and in
October 2010. According to the Credit Institution Act, banks should have
published their financial statements and annual report on their offi cial websites
by the end of May 2010 but our empirical study carried out during September
2010 showed that five small banks did not disclose basic accounting information.
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The situation regarding obligatory reporting improved in October 2010 when
three banks had no fundamental financial statements disclosed.
The practice of Internet financial reporting shows that annual report usually
contains the Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash Flow Statement, Report
of changes in equity and Notes to the financial statements as well as mentioned
mandatory information typical for this report. It must be emphasized that
the main content of the annual reports for the year 2009 of Croatian banks
are financial statements but the extent of disclosure of required elements is
heterogeneous and the subject of this study.
4.2.1 THE SELECTION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ITEMS
In order to determine disclosure level unweighted (scoring) indexes were used.
Those indexes are calculated to determine the level of mandatory and voluntary
disclosure of banks. Mandatory items are the elements of annual report required
by Accounting Act, and are as follows:
1. important events that have occurred since the end of the financial year
(mi1),
2. the company’s likely future development (mi2),
3. activities in the field of research and development (mi3),
4. the information concerning acquisitions of own shares, existence of a sub-
sidiary companies (mi4),
5. existence of a subsidiary (or subsidiaries) (mi5),
6. information on used financial instruments if it is important for assessing
the financial position and business performance (mi6),
7. goals and policies related to companies´ ability to manage financial risk,
together with the policy of protection of any significant forecast transac-
tion for which protection is used (mi7),
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8. the company’s exposure to price risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and cash
flow (mi8),
9. the declaration of acceptance of Code of Corporate Governance (mi9) and
10. the propositions of Code of Corporate Governance or the answered ques-
tionnaire provided by Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency and
Zagreb Stock Exchange (mi10).
Voluntary disclosure index contains:
1) general corporate information (such as brief narrative history of the Bank,
basic organization structure/chart/description of corporate structure, addresses,
general description of business activities),
2) information on corporate governance (details about the chairman like aca-
demic, professional and business experience, the same details about the members
of the Board of Directors and the members of supervisory board) and
3) information on financial performance (graphical presentation of perfor-
mance indicators, profitability ratios like return on asset and return on equity,
capital adequacy ratio, asset growth, revenue growth, profit growth, and the
information on methodology of calculation of all these financial ratios)
4.2.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted in three stages. First, existence of financial and
annual reports published on banks’web sites was researched. Observation and
thus data collection was made in September and October of 2010. In this pe-
riod due to the fulfilling obligations regarding the Decision on the public dis-
closure of creditworthiness requirements of credit institutions, banks reporting
profiles changed. Second, differences in content of annual reports were exam-
ined following Accounting Act and Credit Institutions Act. Finally, analysis of
determinants of banks voluntary disclosures in 2009 was done.
Annual reports for the year 2009 were collected through the Internet in PDF
format and analyzed to determine the level of mandatory disclosure on the
Internet. The most of the voluntary disclosure items were found in those annual
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reports, like information on financial performance, but this study included also
the information published on banks’offi cial websites.
Data regarding banks’market share, capital adequacy ratio, total asset, profit
and loss amount in 2009 are taken from the Croatian National Bank´ website
and are considered as independent variables in this research.
4.3 RESEARCH RESULTS
4.3.1 ON BANKS’COMPLIANCEWITHMANDATORY PROPO-
SITIONS
The first observation showed that small banks that operate at loss are the ones
that did not publish any annual report or financial statement. Correlation
between online reporting and financial result is 0,368 and significant at the 0,05
level.
Among all required elements of annual report (observed in October 2010), the
information on financial instruments and financial risk management are the most
transparent (87,5 %) due to demands of both Acts (Table 1).
TABLE 1 Frequency of mandatory items disclosure3
mi1 mi2 mi3 mi4 mi5 mi6 mi7 mi8 mi9 mi10
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Frequency
(%)
34,38 53,13 62,5 71,88 71,88 87,5 87,5 87,5 34,38 28,13
Source: Authors’calculation.
The least frequently published mandatory items are ones regarding Code of
Corporate Governance and important events that have occurred since the end
of the financial year (published only by 11 banks).
3Mandatory items are distributed according to the explanation (4.2.1. The selection of
public disclosure items).
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Statistically significant correlation between bank size and mandatory disclosure
index (r = 0,389; Sig.= 0,028) suggests that small banks disclose less information
than required in the annual report (Table 2).













































On the other hand, large banks are more transparent regarding their research
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and development activities (Table 3) as well as their plans for the future devel-
opment (Table 4).
TABLE 3











N of Valid Cases 32





TABLE 4 Chi-Square test for bank size and development perspectives disclosed
in annual report









N of Valid Cases 32





Since more than 90% of Croatian banks disclose their financial statements on
the Internet, it can be stated that disclosure requirements (that are of issue
here) of both acts are generally fulfilled.
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4.3.2 ON DETERMINANTS OF BANKS’DISCLOSURE CON-
TENTS
The disclosure of financial performance information is tested by Mann-Whitney
U-test assuming that profitable banks are more transparent in that context
(Tables 5 and 6).










Loss 8 10,69 85,50
Profit 24 18,44 442,50
Total 32
Source: Authors’calculation.












The second hypothesis can be considered as valid since there is statistically
significant difference in financial performance disclosure ranks between banks
that have made profits and those which recorded losses.
As already noted, bank size can be related to e-transparency. To confirm the
third hypothesis, One way ANOVA test was performed (Tables 7 and 8).
TABLE 7 Public disclosure of mandatory and voluntary information in banks
ranked by size
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Small 23 13,7826 5,74422 1,19775 11,2986 16,2666 1,00 22,00
Medium 3 20,0000 5,56776 3,21455 6,1689 33,8311 14,00 25,00
Large 6 21,1667 5,70672 2,32976 15,1778 27,1555 11,00 28,00
Total 32 15,7500 6,40060 1,13148 13,4423 18,0577 1,00 28,00
Source: Authors’calculation.








319,254 2 159,627 4,869 0,015
Within Groups 950,746 29 32,784
Total 1270,000 31
Source: Authors’calculation.
Table 7 shows that large banks have mean value of public disclosure rated as
21,17 and small banks as 13,78. The difference in public disclosure index between
large, medium and small banks is statistically significant (sig.= 0,015) so the
third hypothesis can be accepted.
In Croatia, profitability, bank size and foreign ownership are correlated (Table 9)
in the way that large banks are in dominant foreign ownership and are the ones
resulting higher profit. On the other hand, most of small banks are domestic
and are the ones that recorded loss in 2009.
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TABLE 9 Correlation between bank size, ROA, ROE, domestic ownership and
profit or loss








1,000 0,372(*) 0,333 -
0,588(**)
0,644(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,036 0,062 0,000 0,000
N 32 32 32 32 32
ROA Correlation
Coefficient
0,372(*) 1,000 0,942(**) -0,239 0,863(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,036 0,000 0,188 0,000
N 32 32 32 32 32
ROE Correlation
Coefficient
0,333 0,942(**) 1,000 -0,252 0,856(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,062 0,000 0,163 0,000







-0,239 -0,252 1,000 -
0,519(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,188 0,163 0,002





0,644(**) 0,863(**) 0,856(**) -
0,519(**)
1,000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002
N 32 32 32 32 32
* Correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed).
Source: Authors’calculation.
The following linear regression model is to be fitted into the data in order to
assess the effect of market share and capital adequacy ratio on the general
disclosure level:
Y =ß0 +ß1x1+ß2x2 + e (1)
where Y is total disclosure rank received for each bank, ß0 is the intercept,
E is error term, x1is market share and x2 is capital adequacy ratio.
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1 0,544(a) 0,296 0,247 1,08470 0,296 6,097 2 29 0,006 2,623
1. Predictors: (Constant), market share, capital adequacy ratio
Source: Authors’calculation.
To detect the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression
analysis, the Durbin-Watson statistics was used. It was found that there are no
indications of autocorrelation since d-value is 2,623 (Table 10).






1 Regression 14,348 2 7,174 6,097 0,006
Residual 34,121 29 1,177
Total 48,469 31
Source: Authors’calculation.












1 (Constant) 4,415 0,528 8,362 0,000








Taking into consideration that regression model is statistically significant (Ta-
bles 10, 11 and 12) it can be expressed by the following equation:
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Y = 4,415 + 0,093x1 —0,058x2 (2)
The mentioned model shows that if market share increases by 1 %, general dis-
closure rank (mandatory and voluntary information included) can be improved
by 0,093 and if capital adequacy ration decreases by 1%, general disclosure rank
can be improved by 0,058.
Comparing scoring indexes of mandatory and voluntary information (Table 13),
it can be stated that banks with good practice of mandatory disclosure are more
transparent about their financial performance, corporate governance and other
general business information.
TABLE 13 Correlations between disclosure of general information, financial









Pearson Correlation 1 0,506(**) 0,505(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,003 0,003
Sum of Squares and
Cross-products
52,875 50,438 54,875
Covariance 1,706 1,627 1,770
N 32 32 32
Financial
performance
Pearson Correlation 0,506(**) 1 0,468(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,003 0,007
Sum of Squares and
Cross-products
50,438 188,219 95,938
Covariance 1,627 6,072 3,095
N 32 32 32
Mandatory
information
Pearson Correlation 0,505(**) 0,468(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,003 0,007
Sum of Squares and
Cross-products
54,875 95,938 222,875
Covariance 1,770 3,095 7,190
N 32 32 32
** Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed).
Source: Authors’calculation.
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Online disclosure of financial and annual reports of banks in the Republic of
Croatia is highly aligned to the requests of domestic prudential authorities in
which websites are obligatory form of presenting financial information. How-
ever, some banks still do not fulfill their legal obligation for internet reporting
as is being requested by the Credit Institutions Act since 2009. Furthermore,
heterogeneity of the level of disclosure content can be explained with some bank-
specific indicators. According to the results obtained, large banks (measured
with market share), banks with higher profitability and lower capital adequacy
ratio have higher both mandatory and voluntary disclosure indexes. Thus, banks
with the previously mentioned attributes use their websites to the wider extent
for voluntary financial performance disclosure, probably to differentiate them-
selves from those that are less successful and less transparent. If additional bank
performance indicators were publicly available, more detailed analysis could be
obtained. However, correlations presented in the research results do not imply
the causality of the selected variables. In addition, quantity of disclosed data
does not imply their quality although it is expected that these two should be
positively correlated. Still, disclosures indexes do not necessarily indicate lower
level of web transparency and mandatory compliance due to non existence of
some required data in practice of an individual bank. Nevertheless, it can be
concluded that the unity and compliance of statistical and economic significance
on the determinants of bank disclosure level is achieved, as well as the consis-
tency with some of the mentioned empirical researches and research hypotheses.
Although requirements for higher e-transparency is consistent with the goal of
promoting more intensive market discipline, identification of potential pitfalls
and blunders of such regulatory policies can not be omitted. Some of them
are being discussed in the introductory section of the paper and are common
for both developed and developing countries. The key question is who will
use the disclosed data and how financial public will interpret them. Thus,
higher disclosure level might imply more volatility in the volume and structure
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of bank fund holders as well as in stock prices. In case of bad publicity and
disclosure deficiency of some banks it can lead to an extreme situation of bank
run. Hereafter, it should be noticed that public disclosure requirements put
small banks in Croatia in unfavorable position due to their continuously weaker
performance than banks that are either bigger than the bank in question. Thus,
in order to decrease possibility of misuse of online reports a special (separate)
bank report for depositors that are generally non sophisticated fund holder could
be required for website disclosure by Croatian National Bank. The Board of
directors should be responsible for this report. In addition, due to heterogeneity
of annual reports which reduce their comparability even among the peers it is
expected that this should also be standardized report as well. Research on the
web traffi c of banks in Croatia was not considered in the research and even if
it were, it could not be understood as the ultimate measure of the use of the
presented data. However, it could be assumed that despite of the promotion
of the “invisible hand”mechanism by the regulatory requirements, disclosure
efforts still outweigh wider use and benefits of the disclosed data, at least in
the Republic of Croatia, where more than 90 % of depositors are protected by
the deposit insurance system while subordinated debt holders are marginal in
financial sources and are mostly parent banks.
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